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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

SECURITIES CREDIT CORPORA-TION, A CORPORATION,
Appellant,
-vs.MARION WILLEY, dba MARION
WILLEY & SONS,
Respondent.

Appellant's
Brief
Case No.
8041

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a Judgment on the merits ren-dered by the District Court of Davis County, State of
Utah, in favor of the Defendant, Marion Willey, doing
business as Marion Willey and Sons (Respondent herein)
and against Securities Credit Corporation, a corporation,
Plaintiff, (Appellant herein). Plaintiff will hereinafter be
referred to as Appellant, and· Defendant will hereinafter
be referred to as Respondent.
Appellant commenced this action for claim and de-livery by filing in the lower cour~, a Complaint, which fol-lowed in substantial detail the. form set out in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by this court, (Form 16)
wherein it was alleged:
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"1. Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the pos..
session of the following described personal
property located in Bountiful, Utah: A 1952
Mercury four.-door sedan, Motor No. 52LA..
27, 188.-M.
'' 2. Said property is now in the possession of the
Defendant who is wrongfully withholding the
same from the Plaintiff.
''3. Plaintiff has heretofore made demand upon
the Defndant for the return of said property
but Defendant has wrongfully refused, and
no\v refuses to return the same.
'' 4. That by reason of said wrongful detention,
Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of
$500.00." (R. 1)
Appellant prayed judgment for the return of the
1952 Mercury automobile, and if return of the same
could not be had for its reasonable value, for the sum
of $500.00 damage, and for costs of suit. Summons was
duly served and returned by the sheriff. (R. 27)
With the Complaint, was filed an Affidavit of Re-plevin, signed by John Rademacher, Branch Manager of
the Plaintiff Corporation, wherein it is stated that the
Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to possession of said
1952 Mercury automobile; that "the property is wrong-fully detained by the Defendant; that the cause of the de-tention is unknown to this Affiant, except that Affiant
is informed and believes and therefore alleges, that the De..
fendant claims to have purchased said property from one
Edward S. Barrett, but Affiant further alleges that said
Edward S. Barrett does not have the title nor right to pos-session to said automobile." (R. 19)
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Based upon the Complaint and Affidavit so filed, a
Writ of Replevin was issued out of the court below, upon
which the sheriff of Davis County, after attempting to
obtain said vehicle, made the following return:
"Demand was made upon the within named de . .
fendant for a certain 1952 Mercury, four . .door se. .
dan, Motor Number 52LA. .27, 188. .M; however,
defendant refused to give the information as to the
location of the automobile, therefore, we were un. .
able to take said property heretofore described into
possession. We ~are ;'returning said Writ of Re. .
plevin unsatisfied .. '' (R. 27)
Thereafter, Respondent filed a re. . delivery bond in
connection with the Writ of Replevin, making it unneces . .
sary for the sheriff physically to take possession of said
vehicle.
Respondent, in his Answer, denied Appellant's allega. .
tion of ownership of the said 1952 Mercury automobile
and alleged ownership in himself. (R 2) As a further de . .
fense, he alleged that he purchased the automobile from
one Ed Barrett of Pocatello, Idaho. Under the provision
of Rules 7 (a) and 8 (d) the matters set out in Respon . .
dent's Answer are deemed denied and, therefore, an issue
of fact was presented for trial.
A Counterclaim was also filed in which Respondent
admitted that no certificate of title was delivered to him
by the said Ed Barrett.
Paragraph 3 of the Counterclaim, alleges that the sale
of the automobile by Barrett to the Respondent was with
the full knowledge and consent of the Respondent.
Paragraph 4, alleged that by the provisions of the
laws of the State of Utah and Idaho, that Appellant has
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no right, title or interest in said automobile, or claim
against Respondent.
Paragraph 5, alleged that Respondent is entitled to a
. decree quieting title in Respondent. (R. 3)
Other allegations pertaining to the alleged sale of .
other automobiles by the said Ed Barrett which are not
material to the issues involved herein, were also included
in paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim. (R. 3)
Appellant filed a Reply to the Counterclaim, denying
the foregoing allegations of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. (R. 5)
By so doing, all the affirmative matter set out in Respon..dent's Answer and Counterclaim was denied, leaving the
facts to be determined upon trial of the issues.
Prior to the date fixed for trial of the issues, Respon..dent prepared and served upon counsel for Appellant,
written interrogatories to be answered by the latter, which
interrogatories were thereafter answered and filed with the
court below. (R. 20..-24) (The interrogations and answers
were not designated by Appellant in connection with this
appeal, for the reason that the same were considered im..material and irrelevant to the issues involved herein, as
will be more fully outlined in Appellant's argument. How..ever, Respondent filed a counter designation requesting
said interrogatories and answers to be included in the rec..ord, which was done.)
Subsequently, Respondent's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings was argued by counsel and taken under ad . .
visement by the lower court. The court, in connection with
the matter, rendered a memorandum decision in which the
court, without specifying any reasons, granted said Motion
and directed counsel for Respondent to prepare findings,
judgment and decree as prayed for in said Motion. (R. 7)
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Immediately, counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for Re . .
hearing setting out that Plaintiff's Complaint had fol-lowed the form outlined in the Rules of Civil Procedure
(Form 16), and called to the trial court's attention that un-der Rule 84, such forms are "sufficient under the rules," so
that a motion to dismiss or for a judgment on the plead ..
ings could not have been granted on such a Complaint.
In the alternative, such Motion for Re--hearing further
stated that if the court desired to treat the Motion as one
for summary judgment, then counsel should be given an
opportunity to file counter--affidavits and submit evidence
in contradiction of or in further explanation of the inter-rogatories which the Defendant, Willey, had filed in the
case. (R. 8--11)
This Motion was also taken under advisement by the
court and subsequently denied. Thereafter, the court made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in accordance with the allegations of Defendant's Counter-claim--even though the allegations of such Counterclaim
were denied by Appellant in its Reply and even though,
as will hereinafter appear, such allegations are not con-sistent with the facts.
It is from that decision and the judgment of the trial
court entered thereon, that this appeal is taken.
I

STATEMENT OF POINTS
For the purpose of argument, Appellant has grouped
under two points, the claimed error of the trial court in
connection with its determination below:
I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Respondent's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
II. There is no Evidence or Facts in the Record Suf . .
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/icient to Sustain the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment
Rendered by the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING R£.,
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS.
I
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
the Respondent in this mater, is very brief. It requests the
court to "render judgment in favor of the Defendant on
the pleadings under provisions of Rule 12 (c), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, for the reasons that: a. It appears from
the pleadings that the Defendant is entitled to judgment
dismissing the Complaint and as prayed for in the Counter~
claim. b. The pleadings in this cause are closed. c. The
trial of this cause has been set for April 9, 1953, and a
hearing on this Motion will not delay trial of the cause if
trial becomes necessary.''
Since Respondent specifies that his Motion is made
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12 (c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, it might be well for us at this time to
quote the provisions of this rule. As adopted verbatim
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule pro~
vi des:
"Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the
pleadings are closed but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judg~
ment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
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all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a mo. .
tion by Rule 56."
Inasmuch as the rule provides that this motion is
available after the pleadings are closed, we might look to
the provisions of Rule 7 (a), to determine what pleadings
are necessary and what constitutes the pleadings in a case
to determine when the same are closed-the Respondent,
in this case, having claimed that the pleadings were closed
at the time of the filing of his Motion. Rule 7 (a), pro-vides that there shall be a complaint, an answer and a
reply to a counterclaim denominated as such. Therefore,
in this case, the pleadings were closed when the Appellant
filed its Reply to Respondent's Counterclaim. Confirming
this view of the matter is Moore on Federal Practice, 2nd
Edition, Vol. 2, Section 12.15, where we find the follow-ing statement:
"If a counterclaim (denominated as such) or a
cross--claim is pleaded, or if the court orders a reply,
the pleadings are not closed until the reply (or
answer to a cross. .claim) is served.
"After the pleadings are closed a motion for judg..
ment thereon may be made by any party. The only
qualification is that it be not made so that its dis-position would delay the trial."
Thus, under the foregoing provisions, the Respon . .
dent was entitled to file a motion for a judgment on the
pleadings and explain why Respondent alleged in his Mo-tion, that the pleadings were closed and that such Motion
would not delay the trial of the cause.
The Supreme Court might well wonder why men-tion of this matter is made by Appellant in this Brief. The
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reason is that Respondent claimed in the lower court, and
will undoubtedly claim in the Supreme Court, that the
interrogatories and answers to interrogatories, which were
on file at the time the Motion for Judgment was made
by him, were a part of the pleadings and should be consid..ered with them. However, this is obviously not so under
the Rules, particularly since Appellant was entitled to
have Respondent answer interrogatories and if the plead . .
ings were not closed until such time as all opportunity had
passed for interrogatories to be submitted and answers
thereto filed, it would be impossible to make a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings under this rule.
The basis for determining the merits of a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, is well outlined in Moore's
Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, Section 12.15 at
page 2269 as follows:
" ... a motion for judgment on the pleadings must
be sustained by the undisputed facts appearing in
all the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of
which the court will take judicial notice. For the
purposes of the motion, all well...pleaded material al..legations of the opposing party's pleading are to
be taken as true, and all allegations of the moving
party which have been denied are taken as false.
Conclusions of law are not deemed admitted. Judg..ment on the pleadings may be granted only if, on
the facts as so admitted, the moving party is clearly .
entitled to judgment. Hence, a defendant may not
obtain a judgment on the pleadings on the basis of
the allegations in his answer where no reply is re . .
qui red, since under Rule 8 (d) these allegations are
deemed denied; nor may defendant move on the
basis of an insufficient denial of the allegations of
his answer in plaintiff's reply, where the reply was
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not required or ordered by the court. Plaintiff may
not move for judgment on the pleadings where the
answer raises issues of fact which if proved would
defeat recovery."
Since the adoption of the original rule by the Su. .
preme Court of the United States, an amendment was
added (which is now included not only in the Federal
Rules, but in our own Rules) to the effect that if additional
matter is presented to the court for consideration and not
excluded by the court, the "motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56." But under such circumstances, the Rule goes
on to state that all parties "shall be given reasonable op . .
portunity to present all material made pertinent to such
a motion by Rule 56." Appellant, therefore, contends that
the trial court in the instant matter, was not entitled to
consider anything but the formal pleadings in the case
unless and until it gave Appellant reasonable opportun.ity to submit additional matter to the court in the form of
affidavits or other evidence which, if presented, would
affect the ultimate decision in the case. This, in fact, was
the essence of Appellant's Motion for Re.-hearing in the
trial court, wherein Appellant stated the various facts
which it had available to present to the court in support
of its Complaint and the position taken therein.
In the absence of any explanation by the court in its
memorandum decision as to the basis of its decision grant.ing the motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, it is most
difficult for Appellant to find any apparent explanation
of the court's ruling upon which to make its argument
that such motion was improperly granted. Under the
Rules, the motion in effect admits the allegations of Plain.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tiff's Complaint with respect to ownership of the automo,.,
bile by Plaintiff and wrongful detention by Defendant. On
the other hand, the allegations of Respondent in his Coun,.,
terclaim or Answer to the effect that he owned the auto,., .
mobile or had purchased it from one Ed Barrett, are de,.,
nied specifically or deemed denied under the provisions of
Rule 8 (d) so that for the purpose of the motion, such
matters are deemed to be false.
In the case of Art Metal Construction Company vs.
Lehigh Structural Steel Company, (C. C. A. 3rd) 116
Fed. 2d 57, the plaintiff commenced an action against the
Lehigh Structural Steel Company to recover an alleged
balance owing under a construction contract. The de-fendant, after the pleadings were in, filed a motion for a
judgment on the pleadings which was granted. On ap. .
peal, the Circuit Court reversed the lower court and made
the following statement concerning the effect of a motion
for summary judgment:
"This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon
the pleadings on the motion by the defendant, Rule
12c, Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A., fol-lowing section 723c. In considering such a motion
the facts alleged by the plaintiff must be taken to be
true, and the inquire is whether upon those facts,
plaintiff has stated a cause of action."
In the case of Wyman vs. Wyman (C. C. A. 9th) 109
Fed. 2d 473, 474, the plaintiff brought an action in the Dis-trict Court of the United States for the District of Nevada
to obtain a judgment for accrued alimony alleged to be pay,.,
able under a decree rendered in New York. Following
the filing of the pleadings, defendant made a motion for
judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the
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trial court. On appeal, the Circuit Court made the fol . .
lowing statement:
"In Phenix vs. Bijelich, 30 Nev. 257, 269, 95 P.
351, 353, it is said: 'When a party moves for judg. .
ment on the pleadings, he not only for the purpose
of his motion admits the truth of all the allegations
of his adversary, but must also be deemed to have
admitted the untruth of all his own allegations
which have been denied by his adversary.'
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings is per. .
mitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 12 (c), 28 U. S. C. A. following section 723c.
"In his first affirmative defense in his answer to
the complaint filed herein, the appellee alleged that
on or about October 25, 1932, he became a bona
fide resident of the State of Nevada, and ever since
said date he had been a resident of and domiciled
in said state. The appellant denied this allegation
by her 'Amended Reply to Answer.' Under the
rule of the Phenix case, supra, we must for the
purposes of the motion consider the allegation made
by the appellee that he became a resident of and
was domiciled in Nevada as untrue. This being so,
the court below erred in granting his motion, for,
if that allegation were untrue, the Nevada court
would not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit
for divorce."
The following analysis of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings was made by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Friedman vs. Wash . .
burn Co., 145 Fed. 2d 715:
"After pre. . trial conference and the filing of a stipu. .
lation of facts, appellee filed its motion for judg. .
ment on the pleadings, setting up various grounds
therefor, raising both factual and legal issues: Con. .
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,..

travention of the patent laws; absence of power in
the Federal Court to grant the relief prayed; negli..gence and inexcusable delay showing on the face
of the complaint; estoppel; lack of elements of a
confidential disclosure action. Appellee also as..serted that the action did not fall within the pro..visions of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
"Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro..cedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following section 723c un..der the authority of which appellee filed its motion,
provides: 'After the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.' This motion,
of course, deals only with questions of law arising
on the pleadings, and in considering it, all facts al..
leged by the plaintiff must be taken to be true, the
question being whether upon those facts the plain..tiff has stated a cause of action. Art Metal Con..struction Co. vs. Lehigh Structural Co., 3 Cir., 116
F. 2d 57. In Ulen Contracting Corp. vs. Tri..-County
Electric Co..-op., 1 F. R. D. 284, 285, the court said:
'Judgment is proper on the motion only where no
material issue of fact is presented by the pleadings.
~ ~ ~ 'Such a judgment is allowable not for lack o.f
proof, but for lack of an issue; hence, it is proper
where the pleadings entitle the party to recover
without proof, as where they disclose all the facts
or where the pleadings present no issue of fact or
an immaterial issue.' " (Italics added.)

The court in the Friedman Case went on to say, after
analyzing the matter, that, "It is obvious from our study
of the complaint and answer that many facts were in dis..pute and that such dispute could not be resolved by a
simple study of those pleadings without more."
It is appellant's position in the instant matter that
many facts are in dispute and that such dispute can only
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be resolved through evidence at the trial, unless respondent
is willing to concede the facts claimed by appellant-in
which event appellant rather than respondent would be
entitled to judgment. Certainly, under the law above cited,
the lower court improperly granted Respondent's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.
See also Jay vs. Chicago Bridge and Iron Co., (C.C.A.
lOth) 150 Fed, 2d 247 (a case arising from the Federal
District Court for the District of Utah). There, the Cir-cuit Court of Appeals made the following statement:
"The motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in
the alternative for dismissal of the action, admitted
all matters well pleaded in the complaint. That rule
is too well established to warrant extended dis-cussion.''
On the other hand, Respondent will ,probably con-tend, as he did in the lower court, that the entire file, in-cluding Appellant's answers to interrogatories, should be
considered in determining whether the motion for judg-ment on the pleadings should be granted.
In the case of Friedman v. Washburn Co., supra,
where defendant attached affidavits to its motion for judg-ment on the pleadings on the ground that plaintiff twice
previously dismissed the instant action, the court held:
"The rule involved provides that a notice of dis-missal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed
in any court of the United States or of any state an
action based on or including the same claim. We
think the matter was improperly made a part of
the record, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
being no place to attach exhibits, stipulations or
other evidential matters. Snowhite v. Tide Water
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Associated Oil Co., D.C., 40 F. Supp. 739; Cf.
United States Trust Co. v. Sears, D.C., 29 F. Supp.
643; Palmer v. Palmer, D.C., 31 F. Supp. 861."
If the lower court wished to consider such eviden. .
tiary matter, the Appellant should have been given an op. .
portunity to present such additional maters as it desired
which would affect the determination of the case. Some of
the additional facts which Appellant had available, are
pointed out in Appellant's Motion for Re . .hearing and in. .
elude:
1. A photostatic copy of the original invoice wherein
Lincoln. .Mercury, a division of Ford Motor Company, at
Los Angeles, California, sold to Motor Center of Poca..tello, Inc., a corporation of Pocatello, Idaho, the particular
Mercury herein described under date of August 12, 1952.
2. A photostatic copy of the conditional sales con. .
tract executed on the 9th day of September, 1952, at Poca. .
tello, Idaho, between Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., a
corporation, as seller and Edward S. Barrett of Pocatello,
Idaho, as buyer, covering the 1952 Mercury involved in
this action. This contract of sale provides that, "Title to
said property shall not pass to purchaser until all sums
due under this contract are fully paid in cash."
3. Assignment of such contract by the Motor Center
of Pocatello, Idaho, to Plaintiff herein on September 9,
1952, all of which is shown on the reverse side of said
conditional sales contract on file with the Department of
Law Enforcement of the State of Idaho. (In fact, such
contract of conditional sales provides that the payments
provided for therein, shall be payable "at the office of
Securities Credit Corporation of Colorado.")
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4. Certificate of the Department of Law Enforce..ment of the State of Idaho, that a copy of such condi..tional sales con tract was filed in such office on the 15th
of September, 1952, under and pursuant to the provisions
of Idaho Code 49..-412 entitled, "Chattel Mortgages and
Conditional Sales-Filing-Notice of Certificate-Con..structive Notice."
5. The certificate of title to the motor vehicle involved
in this action issued by the Department of Law Enforce..ment of the State of Idaho, under date of September 16,
1952, wherein Securities Credit Corporation of Pocatello,
Idaho, is shown as lien holder, the nature of the lien being
described as a conditional sales contract.
Appellant is further ready to establish, by competent
evidence, that the payments provided for in said condi..tional sales contract were not made; that said contract was
in default long prior to the commencement of this action;
and that demand for the automobile had been made not
only upon Mr. Barrett, but also upon Respondent, Willey,
when it was found that he had possession of the auto..mobile. Appellant would further prove that at the time
Respondent obtained possession of said automobile, it had
been registered and titled under the laws of the State of
Idaho, had an Idaho license plate affixed to it; that Re..spondent had actual and constructive notice of Appellant's
interest therein; that Respondent obtained possession of
said automobile in Idaho, (so that the transaction would
be governed under the laws of Idaho); that no certificate
of title to the automobile had ever been issued to Re..spondent herein, either by the State of Idaho or the State
of Utah; and that the certificate of title issued by the State
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of Idaho has at all times been in the possession of Ap..pellant herein.
With these matters in mind and with the offer on the
part of Appellant to produce such facts before the trial
court, it was improper for the trial court to consider mat..ters outside the pleadings without considering the effect
of the facts which Appellant offered or might offer for
consideration, and without giving Appellant opportunity
to produce such facts.
However, even considering Respondent's motion to be
one for summary judgment and taking into consideration
all matters in the file, the lower court improperly granted
judgment against Appellant. In the case of National Sure..ty Corporation vs. First National Bank in Indiana, 106
Fed. Supp. 302, 304, an action was brought by plaintiff to
recover possession of certain bonds held by the defendant.
Following the filing of the pleadings, the defendant moved,
not only for judgment on the pleadings but also for sum..mary judgment. The court held that a crucial question of
fact was posed as to whether the bank, having failed to es..tablish an intervening holder in due course between the
theft of the bonds and itself and having none the less pro..ceeded to negotiate them, was a holder in due course, mak..ing the following analysis of the function of a motion for
summary judgment or for a judgment on the pleadings:
"The office of the motion for judgment on the
pleadings or for summary judgment is for practical
purposes the same, and often are both applicable,
but if it is necessary to consider matters outside
pleadings, motion for judgment on the pleadings is
to be treated as a motion for summary judgment,
and neither can be granted if there is any genuine
issue as to any material fact. Barber, District Direc...
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tor vs. Tadayasu, 9 Cir., 186 Fed. 2d 775; Munn
vs. Robinson, D.C., 92 F. Supp. 60.
"Before such motion can be granted the right there . .
to must be clear. Hutchings vs. Lando, D. C., 7 F.
R. D. 668. And it must appear to be a certainty that
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support
of his claim. Michel vs. Maier, D. C., 8 F.R.D. 464.
"Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro..cedure, 28 U.S.C.A., which provides for summary
judgment, it was not intended to deprive litigants
of a right to full hearing on the merits if any issue
of fact exists. The procedure was not intended to
be used as a substitute for regular trial where the
outcome of the litigation depends upon disputed
questions of fact. Merchants Indemnity Corp. of
New York vs. Peterson, 3 Cir., 113 F. 2d 4; Toebel..men vs. Missouri..-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 3 Cir., 130
F. 2d 1016.
"In passing upon a motion for summary judgment,
it is no part of the court's function to decide issues
of fact but solely to determine whether there is an
issue of 'fact to be ~ried. Walling vs. Fairmont
Creamery Co., 8 Cir., 139 F. 2d 318. All doubts as
to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material
fact must be resolved against the party moving for
a summary judgment. Sarnoff vs. Ciaglia, 3 Cir.,
165 F. 2d 167 ."
Finally, in connection with this point, we wish to state
that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not a proper
means of presenting to the court any irregularity or defect
in the pleadings themselves. In other words, Rule 12 (b)
relating to the defenses which may be raised by motion,
contemplate that technicalities in the pleadings should be
raised by a motion to dismiss or failure to state a claim or
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some other such motion which will bring to the court's
attention the particular defect involved. A motion for
judgment on the pleadings lies only when under all the
facts and law, as set out in the pleadings, the person is
not entitled to recover or is as a matter of law, entitled
to recover. As stated in Moore on Federal Practice, Vol.
2, Section 12.15 (page 2273):
"Judgments on pleadings should be given only when
the merits can be determined in that manner, and
not on some matter that may inhere in the case by
virtue of faulty pleadings, but which is not actually
involved in the litigation."
The Supreme Court of the United States has passed
upon this particular point and has set forh the criterion
to be followed in reviewing a judgment on the pleadings.
In the case of Lanasa Fruit Steamship & I Co. vs. Univer. .
sal Insurance Company (1938) 302 U.S. 556, 58 S. Ct.
3 71, 82 L. ed. 4 22, the court had before it the ineterpreta. .
tion of a policy of Marine Insurance which covered a ship. .
ment of bananas that became unmerchantable during a
delay. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
the Defendant, the District Court granted such motion,
which judgment was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Ap. .
peals on the theory that the policy did not cover the loss
from stranding. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the De . .
fendant there for the first time contended that the Com . .
plaint itself was insufficient, upon which point the Su. .
preme Court held:
"It is suggested that the declaration does not allege
that the bananas were shipped in sound condition
and that they would have been merchantable at the
end of a normal voyage, and that there is no allega...
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tion as to the duration of the delay. It does not ap. .
pear that these questions were raised in the District
Court and they were not dealt with by the Court
of Appeals, which evidently assumed the suffi. .
ciency of the declaration to present the main ques. .
tion as to the interpretation of the general coverage
clause. Both courts below have decided the case
upon the assumption that the fruit was in sound
condition when shipped and would have been
merchantable at the end of the voyage had it not
been for the stranding and the consequent delay.
In view of this course of proceedings we make the
same assumption. If any question as to the condi. .
tion of the cargo or length of the delay and its effect
had been presented in the trial court, it might have
been met by amendment of the declaration and the
issue could have been tried; and if the main ques . .
tion, upon the assumption stated, has been wrongly
decided and the case is remanded to the District
Court, there will still be opportunity to try any
other issues of fact or law which may properly be
presented."
It is, therefore, clear that the trial court erred in
granting Respondent's Motion for Judgment on the Plead . .
ings for the following reasons:
a. The Complaint was sufficient to support Appel. .
Ian t' s claim.
b. Questions of fact were raised by the pleadings,
which could only be resolved upon trial of the issues.
c. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ad . .
mitted the truth of the allegations contained in Appellant's
Complaint, which, if so admitted, allows recovery by the
Appellant, and
d. Had the trial court deemed the pleadings faulty,
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Appellant should have been given the opportunity to
amend.
If the trial court desired to treat the motion for
judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment,
Appellant should have been given an opportunity to pro. .
duce evidence of the nature set forth hereinabove, which
at all events would have compelled a finding that respon. .
dent was not entitled to summary judgment.
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR FACTS IN THE
RECORD SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE FIND. .
INGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT REN . .
DERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
While we realize that the trial court relied upon
counsel for Respondent to prepare the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment which were ren. .
dered in this case, nevertheless we are amazed that such
Findings go so far beyond the pleadings and the facts in
determining factual issues wholly without support in the
record and in some instances directly contrary to the actual
facts appearing in the record.
For example, in Finding Number 3, the court states
"that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the automobile in
question but is the assignee of the conditional vendee." (R.
14) (Italics added.) This is both contrary to the matters
alleged in the pleadings as well as contrary to the actual
facts. In his counterclaim, Respondent in this matter al. .
leges that "on or about the 15th day of September, 1952,
Defendant purchased a new 1952 model Mercury auto. .
mobile . . . from one Ed Barrett, doing business as Motor
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Center of Pocatello Inc." (R. 3) In other words, Respon . .
dent herein is the person who acquired the interest, if any,
of the conditional vendee rather than Appellant. Appel . .
lant's interest arises from an assignment of the conditional
sales contract from the conditional vendor.
As to that portion of Finding Number 3 which states
that Plaintiff is not the owner of the automobile in ques . .
tion, we wish to point out that the title issued by the State
of Idaho shows the Appellant to be the lien holder under
a conditional sales contract. While the certificate of title
is not in evidence, Appellant, in its complaint, alleged it
was the owner of the car - which allegation was deemed
admitted. Too, Respondent's claim to title is only through
the conditional vendee.
We are at a loss to understand the purpose or mean . .
ing of the Court's Finding Number 4 to the effect that the
exact amount of the debt of Edward S. Barrett or the Mo . .
tor Center of Pocatello, Inc., to the Plaintiff is not known
to the Plaintiff. The matter contained in this Finding un . .
doubtedly is taken from the interrogatories and answers
thereto on file in the case. Under Interrogatory Number 10,
Respondent requested Appellant to identify the debts and
obligations which might be owing to Appellant from Ed . .
ward S. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello Inc.
Obviously, that question did not relate to the instant trans . .
action involving the automobile in this case for the rea. .
son that Appellant claimed to be the owner of such auto . .
mobile. However, by reason of other transactions Appel . .
lant in this answer to Interrogatory Number 10 stated that
the exact amount of the entire debt was not known but
would be conditional upon whether or not contracts which
had been assigned to it and the payment of which had been
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guaranteed by the Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., would
be paid by the persons primarily liable thereon. In one
particular instance Appellant stated in its answer that a
debt of $528.00 had been liquidated, which debt had been
incurred July 17, 1953. Any other debts that might exist
or be shown to exist have accrued over the past four years
during which Appellant has been doing business with the
Motor Center of Pocatello.
Likewise, the Court's Finding Number 5 to the effect
that no action of any kind has been commenced by plain..tiff against Edward S. Barrett or Motor Center of Poca..tello, Inc., would have no bearing upon the issues in this
case. Obviously an action for claim and delivery lies against
the person or persons having possession of the vehicle.
When demand was made by Appellant for return of the
Mercury automobile and the said Edward S. Barrett failed
and refused to deliver the same, Appellant for the first time
discovered that the automobile was then in the possession
of Defendant in this case. It would have been a useless
and needless action to file an action in Idaho for the pos..session of the Mercury automobile when it was in Utah.
Nor could Appellant have joined Edward S. Barrett or the
Motor Center of Pocatello in the instant case filed in Utah
for the reason that they were not residents of this state
so that the court here had no jurisdiction over them.
Concerning the first sentence of Finding Number 5
wherein the Court states that Plaintiff "has never had
possession of said automobile" such Finding does not
have any basis in the facts or the pleadings. Nor would it
have any bearing upon this case as long as Plaintiff had
complied with the laws of the State of Idaho in connec..tion with the filing of the instruments showing its lien
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upon the automobile in question. Section 49 ..404 of the
Idaho Code provides how a person - either purchaser or
lienholder-acquires an interest in the property as follows:
"Except as provided in sections 49 ..403, 49..412, 49..
413, 49--414 and 49..416, no person acquiring a mo..
tor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such
owner be a dealer or otherwise, shall hereafter ac..
quire any right, title, claim or interest in or to said
motor vehicle until he shall have issued to him a
certificate of title to said motor vehicle, nor shall
any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such per. .
son against a person having possession of such cer. .
ti/icate of title or an assignment of such certificate
o/ said motor vehicle /or a valuable consideration."
{Italics added.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this sec..
tion of the st~tute in the case of Lux vs. Lockridge, 65
Idaho 639, 150 P. (2d) 127. In that case the Plaintiff
agreed to sell to the Gray Motor Company a certain truck
which he was turning in on a new vehicle. In turn the
Gray Motor Company sold the truck (which Plaintiff had
delivered to it prior to receiving the new truck) to the
Defendant Lockridge. The trial court found that Lock..
ridge was a bona fide purchaser for value and without
notice. However, 'inasmuch as Plaintiff had not delivered
the certificate of title to the Gray Motor Company and
therefore the Gray Motor Company in turn had not been
able to deliver the certificate of title to the Defendant Lock..
ridge, judgment was entered against the Defendant re ..
quiring him to deliver the truck over to the Plaintiff on
the ground that the above section of the statute had not
been complied with and therefore the purported sale to
Defendant was void. The court held:
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''There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to
whether defendant knew plaintiff retained the right
to regain possession of his truck in the event the
company could not deliver a new truck. There is,
however, no dispute in the record that the certifi. .
cate of title remained at all times in plaintiff's pos. .
session and was never transferred by him to the
company or defendant and that defendant received
no certificate of title from the company or plaintiff.
All were equally charged with notice of chapter
144, supra, providing that no person could 'acquire
any right, title, claim or interest in or to' a motor
vehicle until the vendee had issued to him the cer. .
tificate of title. Without, therefore, determining
whether or not a sale without the transfer of the
certificate is void, though urged by both parties pro
and con to do so, we are impressed with the co. .
gency of the reasoning in Swartz v. White, 80 Utah
150, 13 P. (2d) 643, to the effect that a purchaser
not receiving the certificate of title is not a bona
fide purchaser for value and therefore as against
defendant the contract existing between plaintiff
and the·company could not be shown, defeating his
rights to retain the truck.''
It is therefore the contention of Appellant in the in. .
stant case that whether or not possession of the automo. .
bile was ever held by it is immaterial. The real issue is
whether Respondent is able to acquire an interest in a mo. .
tor vehicle through obtaining possession of the same with. .
out at the same time obtaining the certificate of title,
where the certificate of title has at all times been in the
hands of a third person, and the vehicle duly registered
showing a third person as the lien holder under a condi. .
tional sales contract. Under the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Utah in the case of Swartz vs. White, 80 Utah
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150, 13 Pac. (2d) 643, it would be impossible for Re~
spondent to acquire any interest in such vehicle adverse
to the Plaintiff herein.
In Finding Number 6, the Court determines that
Plaintiff knew at the time of the purchase of the automo~
bile by the Defendant that the Defendant paid the full
purchase price to Barrett and that Defendant was en~
titled to the possession of said automobile. We submit that
there was nothing in the contract of purchase by Edward
S. Barrett from the Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., which
would preclude the buyer from transferring what equity
he might have in the vehicle to some third person, and
therefore whether or not Appellant knew of the purported
sale by Barrett to Defendant herein would be of no con~
sequence. Under any circumstances the Plaintiff would be
entitled to retain its lien against the car until the purchase
price had been paid, whether such lien were considered to
be one under a conditional sales contract or a chattel
mortgage. As a matter of fact, our Supreme Court has held
that claim and delivery is a proper proceeding to obtain
possession of goods mortgaged under a chattel mortgage
for the purpose thereafter of foreclosing such chattel mort~
gage.
In the case of Morgan v. Layton, 60 Utah 280, 208
Pac. 505, the court held:
"In this case the mortgagor defaulted. Plaintiff as
mortgagee demanded that the debt be paid or that
the property covered by the mortgage be delivered
into her possession. Defendants failed and refused
to comply with the demand. Plaintiff brought this
action for the sole purpose of obtaining possession
of the property. We know of no form of action more
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appropriate, if indeed there is any other approp . .
riate form known to the law.
"The court found that plaintiff had a special prop. .
erty in the furniture to a certain extent of value;
that defendants had defaulted in payment of the
debt; that the mortgage in express terms conferred
upon plaintiff the right of possession, and hence it
found as a conclusion of law that plaintiff was en..
titled to possession of the property....
". . . The court is of opinion, under the facts of
this case, that claim and delivery was a proper form
of action."

In Finding Number 7 the court specifically refers to
interrogatories and determines therefrom that there was a
close business relationship between plaintiff (Appellant)
and the said Edward S. Barrett, which consisted of "the
said Barrett procuring automobiles from the plaintiff and
selling said automobiles to various and divers individuals,
the defendant being the purchaser of one of said automo. .
biles." Obviously, Appellant is not engaged in the auto. .
mobile business. There is nothing in the answers to in. .
terrogatories which would so indicate nor is there any. .
thing that would justify the court in finding that Barrett
procured various automobiles from Appellant. Appellant
is engaged in the finance business and as such purchases
automobile paper. It is also apparent that Appellant fur . .
ther complies with the laws of Idaho with respect to filing
such paper and securing a proper certificate of title from
the Department of Law Enforcement. Again, referring to
the Idaho Code, Sec. 49..-403 provides:
"No person shall hereafter sell or otherwise dispose
of a motor vehicle without delivery to the purchaser
or transferee thereof a certificate of title with such
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assignment thereon as may be necessary to show
title in the purchaser, nor purchase or otherwise
acquire or bring into this state a motor vehicle ...
unless he shall obtain a certificate of title for the
same in his name in accordance with the provisions
of this act . . . '' (Italics added.)
While the provisions of this section were complied
with when Barrett purchased the automobile from Motor
Center of Pocatello, Inc., and Appellant's lien was estab . .
lished, both Barrett and Respondent failed to comply with
the law when attempted transfer was made later to Re . .
spondent.
There was certainly no basis for the foregoing Finding·
No. 7, nor for the next Finding (Number 8) to the effect
that because of such dealings the Appellant is estopped
"from claiming or asserting any right, title or interest in
the said automobile." As hereinbefore pointed out, the
transaction wherein and whereby Appellant obtained its
interest in the automobile occurred on September 9, 1952,
when the contract of sale was executed betw~een Motor
Center of Pocatello, Inc., as seller and Edward S. Barrett
as buyer, which said contract was on the same day as..signed to Appellant for a valuable consideration. It was
not until some time later that Respondent acquired pos . .
session of the automobile and claims to have purchased
the same. Appellant complied with the provisions of Sec. .
tion 49..-412, Idaho Code, relating to filing of the condi,
tional sales contract and has the certificate of title issued
by the Deparment show its lien, thereby complying in
all respects with the laws of Idaho relating to the matter.
How, under such circumstances, could it be estopped to
assert its lien against someone who claims to have acquired
an interest in the automobile thereafter?
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The same argument applies with equal or greater
force with respect to Finding Number 9 to the effect that
"the equities in said cause are so completely and so pre. .
dominantly in favor of the defendant counterclaimant
and against the plaintiff, that the Court is constrained to
hold in favor of the defendant counterclaimant and against
the plaintiff." What equities? There has been no evidence
of the equities in the case, but certainly the pleadings and
interrogatories do not reveal that Respondent has any
equity on his side. He apparently purchased--or attempted
to purchase-an automobile in Idaho from a private in. .
dividual, without checking the registration on the car and
without ascertaining whether the tide to such vehicle was
clear and unencumbered. He had constructive-if not ac . .
tual-notice of Appellant's lien and therefore cannot now
be heard to complain if he failed to obtain anything by
his action.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the trial court was wrong
in granting Respondent's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; that there is no basis or support for the same
either in fact or law and that therefore the Judgment of
the lower court should be reversed and the cause re . .
manded, either to proceed with the trial of the matter or
to enter judgment in favor of Appellant and against Re . .
spondent in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorneys for Appellant
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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